非控股大股东退出威胁对实体企业"脱实向虚"的治理效应研究

Research on the Governance Effect of Non-controlling Large Shareholders'Exit Threats on Entity Financialization

近年来,非控股大股东通过退出威胁来实现公司治理,影响企业资产投资决策.本文以中国2008—2018年实体上市公司为研究样本,探讨非控股大股东退出威胁对实体企业资产投资行为的影响机理.研究发现,着眼于短期利益的非控股大股东以退出威胁为博弈筹码,增加了金融资产投资、减少了实体资产投资和研发投入,即非控股大股东退出威胁对实体企业"脱实向虚"尚未发挥积极的治理效应.进一步依据投资主体的性质进行异质性分析,发现相比机构投资者,作为个体投资者的非控股大股东退出威胁对实体企业"脱实向虚"的助推作用更为显著.

In recent years,the non-controlling shareholder realizes the corporate governance through the threat of withdrawal,which affects the assets investment of the enterprise.Taking China’s listed companies from 2008 to 2018 as the research sample,this paper attempts to explore the impact mechanism of the non-controlling major shareholders'exit threat on the asset investment behavior of real enterprises.The results show that,the non-controlling major shareholders*exit threat increases financial asset investment,reduces real asset investment and R&D investment.That is to say,the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholder’s boosts the real enterprise’s“turning from real to virtual”.Furthermore,according to the nature of the investors,the non-controlling major shareholders are divided into institutional investors and individual investors.It is found that compared with institutional investors,the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders as individual investors has a more significant boosting effect on the "de real to virtual" of real enterprises.