论具体权利概念的结构

On the Structure of the Concept of Concrete Rights

人们现实使用中的具体、特定权利概念一般都是由"行为+权利(抽象、一般的)"所构成。其中的行为是被权利(抽象、一般的)指称的对象,即权利载体;其中的权利(Right)蕴含着承认主体选择行为的自由、自主之义,以"正当(可以)"为本义。现实使用中的少数具体、特定权利概念有特殊性,譬如"生命权",这是以特定利益为权利载体,其中"权利"变义为"不应当"(侵犯),是对外在主体(其他个体、组织和国家)的义务设定。

The concepts of concrete and specific rights in people’s practical use are generally composed of ‘behavior + right(abstract and general)’. Among them, the behavior is the object referred to by right(abstract and general), namely the carrier of right;the right implies the recognition of the subject’s choice of behavior freely and autonomously with ‘justness(be allowed to)’ as its original meaning. A few concepts of concrete and specific rights in practical use have particularity, such as ‘the right to life’, which takes specific interests as the carrier of right, and change the meaning of ‘right’ into ‘should not’(infringe), which is the obligation set for external subjects(other individuals, organizations and countries).