实体企业金融化与审计师选择

Financialization of Entity Enterprises and Auditor Selection

以我国2009—2019年沪深A股非金融业上市公司为样本,理论分析并实证检验实体企业金融化是否及如何影响审计师选择。文章形成以下主要结论:实体企业金融化会抑制选择高质量审计师;机制检验显示,实体企业金融化增加代理成本、引发管理层盈余管理,为避免高质量外部审计监督而选择低质量审计师。内外部环境的异质性检验表明,金融化抑制选择高质量审计师的效应在管理层权力高、市场化程度高、法治环境好及政府干预程度低的样本组更显著。

Taking Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2009 to 2019 as samples,this paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests whether and how financialization of real firms affects auditor selection,and draws the following conclusions:financialization of real firms will inhibit the selection of high-quality auditors;the mechanism test shows that the financialization of real enterprises increases agency costs,triggers earnings management by the management,and chooses low-quality auditors to avoid high-quality external audit supervision.The heterogeneity test of internal and external environment shows that the effect of financialization on the selection of high-quality auditors is more significant in the sample group with high management power,high degree of marketization,good legal environment and low degree of government intervention.