供应商生产违规下政府与核心企业审查策略研究

Auditing Strategy of Government and Core Enterprise on Supplier’s Social Responsibility Violation

随着公众环境与社会意识的提高,因供应商违规生产而造成的环境污染及安全事故等重大事件使供应链中的核心企业遭受品牌声誉受损的巨大风险。因此,在政府审查力度和供应商合规水平不确定情况下,核心企业是否愿意与政府合作审查供应商?本文基于政府与核心企业角色的不同,分别构建了政府单独审查和政府与核心企业合作审查博弈模型,得到了各方的最优策略以及参数对最优策略的影响,进而对两种最优策略进行了比较分析,得出了核心企业是否愿意参与审查的条件。结果表明:(1)当核心企业潜在损失比政府潜在损失更大,或者供应商合规意愿越大时,核心企业越会与政府合作审查供应商;(2)与政府单独审查策略相比,合作审查下供应商合规水平增加但其期望损失变大。考虑到合作审查下因供应商损失增大造成的供应链不稳定问题,本文提出三方联合投资策略,发现在一定投资金额范围内,三方损失会同时降低。最后,通过数值实验分析了相关参数对可投资金额范围的影响。

With anincrease in public environmental and social consciousness,a core enterprise’s brand reputation may be damaged by scandals caused by its supplier’s social responsibility violation.Therefore,is core enterprise willing to cooperate with the government to audit the supplier when government’s audit level and supplier’s compliance level are uncertain?Based on the different roles of government and core enterprise,this paper constructs governmentaudit model as well as government-core enterprise joint audit model respectively,and obtains the corresponding optimal strategies and the impact of parameters on the optimal decisions.A comparative analysis is carried out.The results show that:(1)core enterprise would like to cooperate with the government when the potential loss faced by the core enterprise is greater than that of the government or the supplier’s compliance willingness is much higher;(2)the supplier’s compliance level and expected loss under the joint audit strategy are higher compared with the government audit strategy.Considering the instability of the supply chain caused by the increased supplier loss under the joint audit,this paper proposes a tripartite joint investment strategy,and finds that there exists a certain range of investment amount which can simultaneously reduce the tripartite loss.