摘要
为判别本国与他国科技合作的演化方向及其实现条件,假定各国科技合作成本或收益为科技创新投入成本的线性函数,通过构建演化博弈动态方程、矩阵求解和数值仿真模拟对本国与外国之间的科技合作行为进行博弈分析,得出以下结论:策略稳定均衡点及演化路径受博弈双方参与者初始状态影响;在一定条件下,科技合作成本越低,双方合作欲望越强烈,若科技合作成本超过某一阈值,将驱使博弈双方采取不合作策略,引入政府控制力度参数可以一定程度上加强博弈双方合作可能性。
To discern the evolution direction and realization conditions of scientific and technological cooperation between domestic and foreign countries,assumes that the cost or benefit of scientific and technological cooperation in various countries is a linear function of the input cost of scientific and technological innovation.Through the construction of evolutionary game dynamic equations,matrix solution and numerical simulation,the game analysis on the scientific and technological cooperation between the country and foreign countries was conducted.The following conclusions are drawn:the stable equilibrium point and evolution path of the strategy is affected by the initial states of the two players in the game;under certain conditions,the lower the cost of scientific and technological cooperation,the stronger the desire for cooperation between the two parties.If the cost of scientific and technological cooperation exceeds a certain threshold,it will drive the two parties to adopt a non-cooperative strategy.The introduction of government control parameters can strengthen the possibility of cooperation between the two parties to a certain extent.
作者
龙利娟
王源昌
吕蕾
LONG Li-juan;WANG Yuan-chang;L Lei(School of Mathematics,Yunnan Normal University,Kunming 650500,China)
出处
《科技和产业》
2021年第12期134-142,共9页
Science Technology and Industry
基金
国家自然科学基金(71163046)
国家社会科学基金(16ZDA041)
云南省自然科学基金(2018RD004)。
关键词
政府
跨国科技合作
演化博弈
government
cross-border scientific and technological cooperation
evolutionary game