摘要
对赌协议重构了公司组织中原有的风险、利益以及控制权格局,引来裁判争议不断。此前,受到“海富案”的影响,对赌裁判的争点集中在合同效力。《九民纪要》则依托区分原则将裁判重心转向合同履行,并将其置于资本维持原则的框架下。继续完善与目标公司对赌以及公司担保对赌的规则供给,需要细化资本维持原则规制、构建对赌协议履行障碍的违约救济机制、强化目标公司非控制股东的利益保护,从而构建一个相对妥适的裁判规则。
Valuation adjustment mechanism disrupts the original risk,benefits and control structure of the company organization and leads to judgment disputes.Previously,under the influence of“Haifu Case”,the dispute focus of valuation adjustment mechanism was on the validity of the contract,while Jiumin Minutes shifts the focus of judgment to contract performance based on the principle of separation and places it in the framework of the principle of capital maintenance.To continue to improve the rule supply of target company valuation adjustment mechanism and guarantee valuation adjustment mechanism,it is necessary to refine the regulation of the principle of capital maintenance,construct the default relief mechanism for the obstacle to the performance of valuation adjustment mechanism,and strengthen the protection of the interests of non-controlling shareholders of the target company so as to construct relatively suitable judgment rules.
作者
钱玉文
余学亮
Qian Yuwen;Yu Xueliang
出处
《常州大学学报(社会科学版)》
2021年第6期46-57,共12页
Journal of Changzhou University:Social Science Edition
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目“金融消费安全的公私合作规制研究”(18BFX138)。
关键词
对赌协议
裁判规则
公司担保对赌
资本维持原则
valuation adjustment mechanism
judgment rules
corporate guarantee valuation adjustment mechanism
principle of capital maintenance