融资担保行业竞争与公司经营绩效——基于四川省融资担保行业的系统GMM实证

Industry Competition in China Financing Guarantee Industry——An Empirical Study of System Gmm Based on the Financing Guarantee Industry in Sichuan Province

2014年以来,各省(市)相继开展融资担保行业"减量提(增)质"行动,融资担保行业竞争愈发激烈。文章构建动态面板模型,使用2014—2019年四川省融资担保行业公司级数据,采用系统GMM实证分析发现,融资担保行业竞争总体显著提升了融资担保公司的经营绩效,行业竞争显著提高了小企业的经营绩效,但对大企业的经营绩效影响并不显著,融资担保公司的政治关联显著正向影响经营绩效。上述研究为产业经济学"行业集中度与利润"假说提供了新的证据,为最优金融结构理论带来了地方金融组织的不同声音,同时为"减量提质"及政策性融担公司定位提供了理论基础。

After the year of 2014, China’s provinces have successively carried out “decreasing quantity increasing quality” activities in the financing guarantee industry, and competition in the financing guarantee industry has become increasingly fierce. This article uses the company level of the Sichuan province financing guarantee industry from 2014 to 2019, and build dynamic panel data, using systematic generalized distance estimation methods, found that competition in the financial guarantee industry significantly improves the business performance of financial guarantee companies.The political identity of financial guarantee companies significantly affects the company’s business performance, but industry competition does not significantly affects the business performance of large enterprises, but significantly improves the business performance of small enterprises. The above research provides new evidence for the “concentration-profit” hypothesis of industrial economics, brings different voices of local financial organizations to the theory of optimal financial structure, and at the same time provides “decreasing quantity increasing quality” policy a theoretical basis.