央地关系、转移支付与保基层运转

Central-local Governments Relationship,Transfer Payment and Guaranteeing the Normal Functioning of Primary-level Governments

本文构建了转移支付资金获取和使用过程的博弈模型,对转移支付制度、地方政府行为对保基层运转的影响进行了理论探讨和实证分析,研究表明:(1)现有转移支付制度对自有财力强的地方政府更有利;(2)在追求经济增长的政绩观影响下,地方政府财政支出规模趋于扩张,财政支出结构不优;(3)地方政府财权事权不匹配和财政收入统筹能力不足是地方政府采取策略行为的原因。因此,当前要保障基层政府收入,以缓解基层运转的现实困局,未来要推动建立公共财政目标导向的财权同公共支出责任相适应的财税体制,从根源上解决保基层运转问题。

This paper constructs a game model for the acquisition and use of transfer payment funds to both theoretically discuss and empirically analyze the impact of transfer payment systems and local government behaviors on guaranteeing the normal functioning of primary-level governments.The results are as follows:(1)The existing transfer payment system is more beneficial to the local governments with more financial resources;(2)Under the influence of the pursuit of economic growth,the scale of the local government expenditures has expanded,and the structure of the local government expenditures is not optimal;(3)The reasons why local governments take strategic actions are the mismatch of local government s financial power and administrative power,and insufficient fiscal revenue coordination capacity of the local government.Therefore,it is essential to ensure the revenue of the primary-level governments is sufficient to alleviate the current difficulties in the normal functioning of the primary-level governments.It is suggested that a public finance goal-oriented fiscal and taxation system be established in which financial rights and public expenditure responsibilities are compatible,so as to solve the problem of guaranteeing the normal functioning of the primary-level governments from the root.