腐败治理、自由裁量权与管制权力边界

Corruption Governance,Discretionary Power and Boundaries of Regulatory Powers

本文在以发达国家为蓝本的自由裁量权边界设定的理论模型基础上,引入客户这一主体,将政策执行阶段的腐败行为嵌入到管制权力边界设置的研究中,从而使研究情境更好地拟合发展中国家的普遍情况。研究考察了在存在经济租的情况下,官员利用自由裁量权分享经济租的腐败行为对设置最优自由裁量权边界的影响。结果表明:考虑了腐败因素的官员最优自由裁量权边界小于未考虑腐败因素所得结果;若考虑经济租,则最优边界可结合租的大小收放。文章据此提出,最优自由裁量权应依经济租的大小相机决策,对那些不得不保留的自由裁量权可通过阻隔主体、时间限制以及空间切割进行有效的规制。

Based on the theoretical model of discretionary power boundary-setting in developed countries,this paper introduces a new player,"the customer",incorporating corrupt behaviour at the policies execution stage within the research on the regulatory power boundary-setting,so that the research contextis better adapted to the general situation of developing countries.The paper examines the influence of the bureaucrats'corrupt behaviour on the optimal discretionary power boundary-setting when they use discretionary power to share economic rents.The results of the study indicate that the boundary of the optimal discretionary power of bureaucrats is lower when contingent corruption factors are considered than when they are not,and if economic rents are considered,it can be adjusted with the size of the rent.Based on this,the paper proposes that the optimal discretionary power should be determined according to the size of the economic rents.The discretionary power that must be retained can be effectively regulated by blocking subjects,restricting time and separating spaces.