博弈视角下课税对银行金融创新最优合约设计影响分析

Analysis of the Impact of Taxation on the Optimal Contract Design of Bank Financial Innovation from the Perspective of Game

税收是影响银行金融创新最优合约设计的重要因素,研究构建包含税收因素的Stackelberg博弈模型,基于不同信息环境探讨课税对银行金融创新最优合约激励机制的影响。对称信息条件下,对发行端和投资端课税呈税收中性特征;非对称信息条件下,对投资端课税呈税收非中性特征。课税降低受托方尽职尽责水平和浮动报酬,导致合约对其激励不足。低工作效率下,受托方固定报酬和浮动报酬随税率的提高而下降;高工作效率下,受托方固定报酬随税率的提高而下降,浮动报酬呈“倒U型”特征。此外,银行创新业务合约设计税收效应随受托方风险规避程度不同而变化。

Taxation is an important institutional factor that affects the optimal contract design of bank financial innovation.This study constructs a Stackelberg Game model that includes tax factors,and explores the impact of taxation on the optimal contract incentive mechanism for bank financial innovation based on different information environments.Under the condition of symmetric information,the result shows that,the taxation on the issue side and the investment side is tax neutral,while under the condition of asymmetric information,the taxation on the investment side is non-neutral.Taxation reduces the trustee′s due diligence and floating remuneration level of the trustee in high work efficiency and low work efficiency,resulting in insufficient incentives for the trustee in the contract.Under low work efficiency,the fixed remuneration and floating remuneration received by the trustee will decrease with the increase of tax rate;while under high work efficiency,the fixed remuneration received by the trustee declines,and the floating remuneration demonstrates an inverted U-shaped characteristic which first rises and then falls.In addition,the taxation effect of the bank′s innovative business contract design varieswith the degree of risk aversion of the trustee.