拥挤效应下双寡头港口定价及政府投资决策

Duopoly Port Pricing and Government Investment Decision under Congestion Effect

针对目前港口等交通领域发生的拥挤现象,首先基于Hotelling模型给定发货人选择港口的效用,其次通过Nash均衡求解,分析双寡头港口的定价及政府投资决策。研究发现:拥挤程度较大时,港口企业的定价和利润会下降。如果港口所在城市道路较为畅通,改善港口的服务水平,会有利于该港口企业利润的提升;如果港口所在城市道路较为拥挤,则港口单方面做出改善服务水平的决策不一定会提升港口企业的利润。此外,当道路本身拥挤严重时,政府增加投资会起到改善通行环境,使港口企业利润最大化的作用;当道路通行状况良好时,政府追加投资会引发双方企业为争夺客户资源而展开的低价竞争,导致港口企业整体利润下降。

In view of the congestion phenomenon in ports and other transportation fields,the pricing and government investment decisions of duopoly ports are analyzed based on Hotelling model and Nash equilibrium solution.It is found that the pricing and profit of port enterprises will decrease when the degree of congestion is large.If the city where the port is located has smooth roads,improving the service level of the port will be conducive to the improvement of the profit of the port enterprises;if the port is located in a congested city,the port's unilateral decision to improve the service level may not improve the profits of port enterprises.In addition,when the road itself is seriously crowded,the government will increase investment to improve the traffic environment,so as to maximize the profit of port enterprises;however,when the road is in good condition,the government's additional investment will trigger the low-cost competition between enterprises of both sides for customer resources,resulting in the decline of the overall profit of port enterprises.