考虑双渠道努力因素的三级供应链联合契约协调机制研究

Research on the Coordination Mechanism of Three-echelon Supply Chain with Combined Contract Considering Dual-channel Sales E ort

本文针对线上直销线下零售双渠道并存的情形,考虑双渠道努力因素的三级供应链联合契约问题。通过研究集中决策下的三级供应链模型,得到零售商及制造商各自最优销售努力水平、零售商最优订货量及制造商在线上直销渠道的最优备货量;发现收益共享契约不能使双渠道下三级供应链达到协调。在此基础上,分别研究仅在单阶段(分销商—零售商)实施回馈与惩罚契约及双阶段(制造商—分销商—零售商)均实施回馈与惩罚契约的两种联合契约,发现后者可以使供应链达到协调。通过对单阶段和双阶段回馈与惩罚契约使用前后零售商和制造商的最优决策以及供应链各成员利润的变化,验证了使用双阶段联合契约协调供应链的可行性。算例分析结果表明,在双阶段联合契约下,供应链及其成员的利润相对于单阶段联合契约机制下更高。

In this paper,we study the joint contract of the three-echelon supply chain under the condition of the coexistence of online and offline retail channels.By studying the supply chain model under centralized decision,we get the optimal sales effort level of retailer and manu-facturer,the optimal order quantity of retailer and the optimal stock quantity of manufacturers’online channel,and we describe the optimal decisions of retailers and manufacturers under revenue sharing contract.At the same time,we find that the revenue-sharing contract cannot coordinate the three-echelon supply chain.Based on that,two kinds of combined contracts are studied,which are proposing rebate-inducing contracts only in one stage(distributor-retailer)and in both two stages(manufacturer-distributor-retailer).By comparing the optimal decisions of retailers and manufacturers before and after the using of single-stage and two-stage feedback and punishment contracts,as well as the profit changes of supply chain members,we verified the feasibility of using two-stage joint contract to coordinate the supply chain.It is found that the latter can coordinate the supply chain.The numerical results show that the two-stage combined contract can coordinate the supply chain and the pro t of all supply chain members is higher than that of single-stage combined contract.