摘要
如何有效发挥政府“有形之手”对企业创新的激励作用,优化公共资源配置效率,是实施创新驱动战略和推动经济高质量发展的关键一环。基于2001-2017年中国非金融类A股上市公司面板数据,用研发投资衡量创新投入数量,用专利产出衡量创新投入转化质量,从理论上分析政府研发补贴对企业创新投入数量和投入转化质量的作用机制,并采用固定效应模型、联立方程模型等进行实证检验。结果发现:第一,政府研发补贴能够显著提高企业研发投资额,表明政府补贴对企业创新投入存在数量激励,同时,企业研发投资对专利产出具有显著正向影响,增加创新投入资金数量是确保投入转化质量的必要非充分条件;第二,在控制内生性后,政府研发补贴对企业专利产出具有不显著负向影响,表明政府研发补贴未能形成创新投入质量导向;第三,在政府干预程度较低、法治水平较好的情况下,政府研发补贴能够同时提升企业研发投资与专利产出,证实寻租行为、逆向选择行为和缺乏政府监管等是政府补贴无法有效发挥投入质量导向作用的潜在原因。
How to exert government’s incentive effects on corporate innovation and optimize allocation efficiency of public resources is a key link to implement innovation-driven strategy and promote economy high-quality development.Based on panel data of China’s non-financial A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2017,this paper has discussed the mechanism of government R&D subsidy on quantity of innovation input measured by R&D investment,and transformation quality of innovation input measured by patent output.Fixed effect,simultaneous equation and Heckman two-stage Models are established to make corresponding empirical tests.Results show that government R&D subsidy has significantly positive effects on corporate R&D investment,indicating that government subsidies have quantitative incentives for enterprises’innovation investment.At the same time,enterprise R&D investment has a significant positive impact on patent output.Thus,it is a necessary and insufficient condition to ensure the quality of investment transformation.Secondly,the negative impacts of government R&D subsidy on corporate innovation output are not significant in statistics when endogeneity is controlled,indicating that government R&D subsidies fail to form the quality orientation of innovation investment.Finally,under the condition of low government intervention and good rule of law,government R&D subsidy could significantly enhance both corporate R&D investment and patent output,which confirmed that rent-seeking behavior,adverse selection behavior and being lack of government supervision are the potential reasons why government subsidies can not effectively play the role of input quality orientation.
作者
童馨乐
杨璨
Wang Jinmin
Tong Xinle;Yang Can;Wang Jinmin(School of Finance,Nanjing University of Finance&Economics;School of Economics,Fudan University;Business School,University of Nottingham)
出处
《宏观质量研究》
CSSCI
2022年第1期27-45,共19页
Journal of Macro-quality Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71673128、71803078)
江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2020SJZDA048)
江苏高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(2018SJA0253)的阶段性成果。
关键词
政府研发补贴
企业创新投入
数量激励
质量导向
government R&D subsidy
corporate innovation input
quantity incentive
quality orientation