代理成本、股权质押与非效率投资关系的实证研究

An Empirical Study of the Relationship among Agency Cost,Equity Pledge and Inefficient Investment

本文以2012-2019年中国A股市场2102家上市企业为研究样本,从股权、债权和外部利益相关者三个角度研究公司股权质押、非效率投资与代理成本之间的关系,并检验股权质押的中介效应。研究发现:上市公司代理成本能对股权质押与非效率投资产生治理效应。较低的代理成本能抑制股东股权质押行为,降低质押频次以及质押比例,并改善公司非效率投资程度,减少公司过度投资或投资不足。其中债权代理成本以及外部利益相关者代理成本对股权质押及非效率投资的治理效应最为显著。进一步研究发现,股权质押对代理成本及非效率投资的改善存在部分中介效应。

Taking 2102 listed companies in China′s A-share market from 2012 to 2019 as research samples,this paper studies the relationship among equity pledge,inefficient investment and agency cost from the perspectives of equity,creditor′s rights and external stakeholders,and tests the intermediary effect of equity pledge.It is found that the agency cost of listed companies can have a governance effect on equity pledge and inefficient investment.Lower agency cost can inhibit the pledge of shareholders′equity,reduce the pledge frequency and pledge proportion,improve the company′s inefficient investment,and reduce the company′s over investment or underinvestment.Among them,the debt agency cost and the agency cost of external stakeholders have the most significant governance effects on equity pledge and inefficient investment.Further research shows that equity pledge has some intermediary effects on the improvement of agency cost and inefficient investment.