资金受限的中小企业中断保险购买决策分析

Decision analysis of capital-constrained SMEs to purchase interruption insurance

营业中断和资金不足是很多中小企业经营过程经常遭遇的困境。同时,中小企业处于供应链竞争中的弱势地位,其决策行为受强势企业影响。针对处于供应链弱势地位且资金受限的供应商面对营业中断风险时,利用Stackelberg博弈分析了供应商购买和不购买营业中断保险时供应链成员的最优决策,并对两种情况进行了对比分析。研究结果表明:供应商自有资金水平影响供应商的选择,当其自有资金水平低时,会选择购买营业中断保险;当其自有资金水平高时,选择不购买营业中断保险;而当供应商自有资金水平处于中等时,供应商的选择又会受到保险费率的影响。并且当保险费率较高时,无论是否购买针对营业中断风险的保险,供应商总是处于亏损状态。当保险费率较低时,供应商会因购买保险增加成本而纠结。

Business interruption and lack of funds are the difficulties that many small and medium enterprises(SMEs)often encounter in the business process.At the same time,SMEs are in a weak position in the supply chain competition,and their decision behaviors are affected by strong enterprises.This paper uses Stackelberg game to analyze the optimal decisions of supply chain members when the supplier is in a weak position in the supply chain with limited capital and faces the risk of business interruption,and makes a comparative analysis about the two cases.The results show that the level of the supplier’s own capital affects his choice.When the level of own capital is low,he will choose to buy business interruption insurance;when the level of his own capital is high,he chooses not to buy business interruption insurance;when the level of his own capital is medium,his choice will be affected by the insurance premium rate.And when the premium rate is high,the supplier is always at a loss regardless of whether to buy the insurance.When the premium rate is low,the supplier will be entangled by the increased cost of the insurance.