中央、地方政府与企业低碳协同发展的实现策略——以京津冀地区为例

Strategies for achieving low⁃carbon coordinated development of central government,local governments and enterprises:a case on the Beijing⁃Tianjin⁃Hebei Region

低碳协同发展的实现需要政府的引领和企业的参与。鉴于中国式分权的特点,地方政府和企业在政策执行过程中面临与中央政府目标不一致的困境。为此,以京津冀地区低碳协同发展政策实施过程中相关博弈方为研究对象,考虑同级地方政府竞争所带来的正、负外部效应对地方政府行动力度的影响,构建央地企三方演化博弈模型,探讨中央管控地方政府和企业完成低碳改革的有效政策工具;并借助数值仿真技术研究博弈方的行动力度、政府的奖罚力度和同级地方政府竞争所带来的正、负外部效应对系统演化动态轨迹的影响。结果显示:①调节博弈方(中央政府、地方政府和企业)的行动力度能够影响系统趋稳的时间,且从污染源头强化长效监督更易于构建精准化治污防控体制。②中央政府惩罚力度和地方政府拨付给企业的专项治理资金比例的增大均会不同程度地缩短系统趋稳的时间,且行政处罚和经济处罚效果差异不大。③同级地方政府竞争所带来的正、负外部效应增大均会小幅延长系统趋稳的时间,但正外部效应的弹性大于负外部效应,即正外部效应参数可调节范围更广泛,投资低碳排放技术改革所产生的正外部效应更易于控制。因此,央地企三方应根据自身目标选择适宜的行动力度,三管齐下恪尽职守共同发力;积极建立有效的奖惩机制,最大限度地激发地方政府和企业的主观能动性;提倡地方政府间互帮互助,有序推进“先富”带动“后富”,避免“搭便车”和“恶性竞争”现象的发生,是高效快速地实现低碳协同发展的有效措施。

The realization of low⁃carbon coordinated development requires the leadership of the government and the participation of enterprises.In view of the characteristics of Chinese⁃style decentralization,local governments and enterprises face the dilemma of in⁃consistency with the goals of the central government in the process of policy implementation.This paper takes the relevant game parties in the implementation of the low⁃carbon coordinated development policy in the Beijing⁃Tianjin⁃Hebei region as research objects,and considers the impact of the positive and negative external effects brought about by the competition of same⁃level local governments on the action.An evolutionary game model consisting of the central government,local governments and enterprises is established to ex⁃plore effective policy tools for the central government to control local governments and enterprises in the completion of low⁃carbon re⁃forms.Moreover,this paper uses numerical simulation technology to study the influence of the players􀆳action,the government􀆳s rewards and punishments,and the positive and negative external effects brought by the competition of same⁃level local governments on the dy⁃namic trajectory of the system evolution and stability strategy.The results show that:①Adjusting the actions of game players(the cen⁃tral government,local governments,and enterprises)can affect the time for the system to stabilize,and strengthening long⁃term supervi⁃sion from the source of pollution makes it easier to build a precise pollution prevention and control system.②Increasing the central government􀆳s penalties and the proportion of special governance funds allocated by local governments to enterprises will shorten the time for system stabilization to varying degrees,and the effects of political penalties and economic penalties are not much different.③Increasing the positive and negative externalities brought about by the competition of same⁃level local governments will slightly pro⁃long the time for the system to stabilize,but the elasticity of positive externalities is greater than that of negative externalities,that is,the parameters of positive externalities can be adjusted more widely,and the positive externalities generated by investing in low⁃carbon emission technology reform are easier to control.Therefore,the central government,local governments,and enterprises should choose appropriate actions based on their own goals,fulfill their duties,and work together.Moreover,the central government should actively es⁃tablish an effective reward and punishment mechanism to maximize the initiative of local governments and enterprises.The central gov⁃ernment should advocate mutual assistance among local governments,orderly promote the practice of encouraging those areas prosper first to help those lagging behind,avoid the occurrence of‘free⁃riding’and‘vicious competition’,and achieve low⁃carbon coordinated development efficiently and quickly.