摘要
基于重大工程的特殊性,研究其中的业主和咨询机构在进行重大基础设施工程建设时,在完成合同目标的基础上进行知识协同创新的博弈过程,并将双方博弈的策略选择作为一个连续的变量,建立无创新激励和有创新激励两种情形下的演化博弈模型,分析不同情形下双方的演进条件、社会福利变化等。
Based on the particularity of major projects,this paper studies the game process of collaborative innovation of knowledge between the owner and the consulting organization in the construction of major infrastructure projects on the basis of completing the contract objectives,and regards the game strategy selection of both sides as a continuous variable,and establishes the evolutionary game model under the two situations of no innovation incentive and innovation incentive.It also analyzes the evolution conditions and social welfare changes of both sides in different situations.
作者
班佳梦
李烨
BAN Jiameng;LI Ye(School of Management,Guizhou University,Guiyang 550025,China;Development Strategy Research Center of Karst Area,Guizhou University,Guiyang 550025,China)
出处
《工程经济》
2021年第12期72-75,共4页
ENGINEERING ECONOMY
关键词
重大工程
协同创新
创新激励
演化博弈
连续性变量
major projects
collaborative innovation
innovation incentives
evolutionary game
continuous variables