税收规避与审计收费

Tax Evasion and Audit Fees

本文从税收规避的价值效应、信息质量效应和代理问题等角度,探讨了税收规避与审计收费的关系。研究发现:税收规避与审计收费整体上呈“U”型关系;当公司税收规避程度较低时,避税的价值效应占主导,税收规避程度与审计收费负相关;当公司税收规避程度较高时,避税引发的代理问题占主导,表现为税收规避程度与审计收费正相关。上述因果关系的成立不因产权性质的不同而发生改变。进一步分析表明,机构投资者持股和调研均发挥了监督作用,能够相应地强化价值效应和削弱代理冲突。本文丰富了审计师视角下企业避税的二重作用效应研究,也推进了不同风险水平下机构投资者的公司治理效果研究。

This paper discusses the relationship between tax evasion and audit fees from the perspectives of value effect, information quality effect and agency problem of tax evasion.It is found that tax evasion and audit fees have a"U"relationship as a whole;When the degree of tax avoidance is low, the value effect of tax avoidance is dominant, and the degree of tax avoidance is negatively correlated with audit fees;When the company’s tax avoidance degree is high, the agency problem caused by tax avoidance is dominant, which shows that the degree of tax avoidance is positively related to audit fees.The establishment of the above causality will not change due to the nature of property rights.Further analysis shows that institutional investors’ shareholding and research play a supervisory role, which can correspondingly strengthen the value effect and weaken the agency conflict.This paper not only enriches the research on the dual effect of corporate tax avoidance from the perspective of auditors, but also promotes the research on the corporate governance effect of institutional investors under different risk levels.