董责险对企业非效率投资的抑制机理--基于监督与信号传递效应的共同中介作用

Restraining Mechanism of Directors’and Officers’Liability Insurance on Inefficient Investment--Based on the Common Mediation of Supervision and Signal Transmission

董事高管责任保险作为一种分散企业经营风险的工具,也是保险公司以非投资者身份参与上市公司治理的一种重要形式。本文以2007—2018年A股上市公司作为研究样本,运用中介效应分步检验法,研究表明董责险通过降低企业内部代理成本和加剧外部融资约束来抑制企业的非效率投资和过度投资行为,代理成本和融资约束在其中发挥部分中介作用,说明董责险一方面能够完善企业的监督机制,另一方面又向外界传递企业存在风险的信号。进一步检验发现,董事高管责任保险的抑制作用在成熟期企业和国有企业中表现得更加显著。本文为上市公司购买董责险、健全和完善公司治理机制提供参考。

The directors and officers liability insurance is not only a tool to disperse corporate risks,but also an important form for insurance companies to take part in corporate governance of listed companies as non-investors.Based on the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018,using the stepwise regression and mediation analysis,it is found that introducing the directors and officers liability insurance can reduce internal agency costs and intensify external financing constraints,so as to reduce the inefficient investment and excessive investment behavior.Agency costs and financing constraints play the role of the partial mediation,which means that although introducing the directors and officers liability insurance may improve the corporate supervision mechanism,it also indicates the existence of risks.Further,the directors and officers liability insurance is more significant in mature and state-owned enterprises.The paper may provide references for listed companies to purchase the directors and officers liability insurance and enhance the corporate governance mechanism.