商誉减值与公司业绩预告行为

Goodwill Impairment and Companies’ Earnings Forecasts

近年来,商誉减值引发的公司业绩“暴雷”风险成为资本市场的热点话题。本文基于中国A股上市公司数据,考察了商誉减值对业绩预告行为的影响。研究发现,商誉减值提高了公司自愿披露业绩预告积极性,但降低了业绩预告精确度和准确度。机制检验表明,商誉减值通过增加双重代理成本降低业绩预告精确度和准确度;坏消息、卖空机制下,发生商誉减值的公司通过降低业绩预告精确度和准确度以维稳股价的动机更强。进一步分析表明,商誉减值降低业绩预告精确度、准确度的作用在内部控制质量较低、分析师跟踪较少的公司中更显著,在自愿披露公司与强制披露公司之间不存在显著差异。本文结论对政策制定中防范商誉减值风险、完善上市公司信息披露制度提供了实证证据。

Recently,the business risk by goodwill impairment has become a hot topic in Chinese capital market.This paper investigates the relationship between goodwill impairment and earnings forecasts based on the data of China’s A-share listed companies.The study finds that the goodwill impairment increases companies’willingness to voluntarily issue earnings forecasts,but induces less accurate forecasts.Furthermore,the mechanism study shows that goodwill impairment affects the accuracy of earnings forecasts mainly by increasing dual agency cost.Under bad news and short-selling mechanism,companies with impairment of goodwill have a stronger motivation to maintain stock prices by reducing the accuracy of earnings forecasts.Further analysis shows that the effect of impairment of goodwill in reducing the accuracy of earnings forecasts is more significant in companies with low internal control quality and less analyst follow-up,and that there is no significant difference between voluntary disclosure companies and mandatory disclosure companies.The conclusions of this paper have reference significance for preventing the goodwill impairment risks and improving the company’s information disclosure.