信息不对称背景下过度自信的零售商融资策略

Financing the overconfident newsvendor under the information asymmetry

过度自信的零售商对于随机事件的结果的认知比实际情况更确定.我们研究了包含一个利润最大化的银行和一个过度自信的零售商的系统.其中,零售商受到资金约束,可能需要使用银行贷款.基于零售商的初始资金,我们将零售商分为严重贫困、中等贫困和富裕三类.在信息对称和信息不对称的情况下,得到了零售商的均衡订货量和银行利率.在信息对称的情况下,资金受限的零售商总是使用银行贷款.在信息不对称的情况下,当零售商严重贫困时,他会向银行贷款.然而,当零售商中等贫困时,他会使用全部的初始资金,但不使用银行贷款.资金受限的零售商愿意向银行披露其对市场需求的认知.在某些情况下,信息不对称会减少双边界化效应造成的系统利润损失.

Overconfident newsvendors perceive the expected outcome of an uncertain event as more certain than actuality.Built upon the classic newsvendor model,a system with a profit-maximizing bank and an overconfident retailer is studied,where the retailer is capital-constrained and might borrow bank loans.Based on retailers’initial capital,we clarify them as severely poor,medium poor and rich,respectively.We obtain the equilibrium order quantity and bank interest rate under the information symmetry and asymmetry.Under the information symmetry,when the retailer is severely poor or medium poor,he always accesses bank loans.Under the information asymmetry,when the retailer is severely poor,he borrows from the bank.However,when the retailer is medium poor,he uses up all his initial capital without borrowing bank loans.The retailer with limited funds is willing to disclose his cognition of the market demand to the bank.The information asymmetry might reduce the loss of the system’s profit,which is caused by double marginalization effect.