经济转型视域下的地方政府投资与资源错配--环境规制的门槛效应及国企依赖度的调节效应

Local Government Investment and Resource Mismatch in the Perspective of Economic Transformation:the Threshold Effect of Environmental Regulation and the Moderating Effect of State-owned Enterprise Dependence

地方政府投资既是对资源的直接配置,也会通过改变公共服务供给的结构和分布来影响资源的流动与配置。在粗放型经济增长方式下的高速增长阶段,地方政府在“GDP增长竞争”中有过度投资的倾向,并偏向于实现短期内更快的经济增长而忽视资源配置效率的提高;同时,在城市化的快速推进和经济增长极的培育过程中,地方政府投资会加剧公共服务非均等化,并可能通过“虹吸效应”促使资源在大城市、发达地区及重点领域过度聚集,进而加剧地区资源错配。在集约型经济增长方式下的高质量发展阶段,地方政府投资转向适度,并注重效率提升和公共服务均等化,将有利于减轻资源错配。采用2007—2019年中国29个样本地区数据的分析表明:总体上看,地方政府投资强度(人均地方政府投资)增加在一定程度上加剧了地区资源错配,且地区经济对国有企业的依赖度越高,该负面影响越大;当环境规制强度过低和过高时地方政府投资强度增加都会加剧资源错配,而在适度的环境规制强度下地方政府投资强度增加可以减轻资源错配,表明从高速增长向高质量发展的经济转型有利于地方政府投资对资源错配的改善,但跨越发展阶段的过激转型政策也不利于资源配置优化和经济高质量发展;在资源配置过度时地方政府投资强度增加会加剧资源错配,而在资源配置不足时会减轻资源错配;在东部地区和西部地区地方政府投资强度增加会加剧资源错配,而在中部地区会减轻资源错配。在发展方式转变和经济转型过程中,要进一步深化政府投资体制改革和要素市场化配置改革,促进公共服务均等化,提高资源流动和配置效率;全面深化国有企业改革,提升国有企业生产效率和资源配置能力;适度提高环境规制强度,促进地区资源配置优化和经济高质量发展。

Local government investment is not only a direct allocation of resources,but also affects the flow and allocation of resources by changing the structure and distribution of public service supply.In the rapid growth stage of extensive economic growth mode,local governments tend to over-invest in the“GDP growth competition”and tend to achieve faster economic growth in the short term while ignoring the improvement of resource allocation efficiency.At the same time,in the process of rapid urbanization and the cultivation of economic growth poles,local government investment will aggravate the inequality of public services,and may promote the excessive accumulation of resources in large cities,developed regions and key areas through the“siphon effect”,thereby exacerbating regional resource mismatch.In the stage of high-quality development under the intensive economic growth mode,local government investment shifts to a moderate level,focusing on efficiency improvement and equalization of public services,which will help alleviate resource mismatch.Based on the data of 29 sample regions in China from 2007 to 2019,the analysis shows that on the whole,the increase of local government investment intensity(per capita local government investment)intensifies the regional resource mismatch to a certain extent,and the higher the dependence of the regional economy on state-owned enterprises,the greater the negative impact.When the intensity of environmental regulation is too low or too high,the increase of local government investment intensity will aggravate the resource mismatch,while under the moderate intensity of environmental regulation,the increase of local government investment intensity can alleviate the resource mismatch.The results show that the economic transformation from high-speed growth to high-quality development is beneficial to alleviating the resource mismatch of local government investment,but the radical transformation policy that spans the development stage is not conducive to the optimization of resource allocation and high-quality economic development.In the case of excessive resource allocation,the increase of local government investment intensity will aggravate the resource mismatch,while in the case of insufficient resource allocation,it will alleviate the resource mismatch.The increase of local government investment intensity in the eastern and western regions will aggravate resource mismatch,while in the central regions,it will alleviate resource mismatch.In the process of the transformation of development mode and the economy,it is necessary to further deepen the reform of the government investment system and the market-oriented allocation of factors,promote the equalization of public services,improve the flow of resources and the efficiency of allocation.Additionally,it is also necessary to comprehensively deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises and improve their productivity and capacity to allocate resources,appropriately increase the intensity of environmental regulations,and promote the optimization of regional resource allocation and high-quality economic development.