供应链博弈类型与补贴行为对最优定价的影响分析

Analysis of the Influence of Supply Chain Game Types and Subsidy Strategy on Optimal Pricing

在由单制造商和双寡头零售商组成的、提供异质且具有替代性的两种产品的供应链中,分别构建制造商领导下的三种斯塔克尔伯格博弈和三者的古诺博弈,分析不同产品因素与厂商博弈类型对最优批发价和销售价的影响,对不同水平下影响因素的作用效果进行研究,并讨论了补贴策略对改善零售商间古诺博弈结果的可行性。结果表明零售商间的古诺博弈可以通过补贴行为中止,并且两个零售商都能从补贴行为中获利;价格弹性越低,潜在市场规模越大,价格可替代性和市场规模差异对价格增长的影响越显著;制造商和零售商的整合可以提供最低的产品售价。

Three types of Stackelberg games under manufacturer’s leadership and collusion game of the wholesale are constructed respectively in a supply chain consisted of one manufacturer and duopoly retailers,which provide two different and alternative products.The effects of product factors and game types on the optimal wholesale price and sales price are analyzed.The effects of the influencing factors at different levels are studied.The feasibility of subsidy strategy is discussed to improve the outcome of Courtnot game among retailers.The result shows that the Courtnot game between retailers can be suspended by a subsidy and both retailers can benefit from the subsidy.The lower the price elasticity is,the larger potential market size becomes,and the more significant effect on the price increase of the substitutability and market size difference generates.The integration of manufacturers and retailers can provide the lowest product price.