监管情境下的食品生产者行为演化博弈模型

Evolutionary Game Model of Food Producers’Behavior under Supervision

研究不同监管情境下的食品生产者的行为选择问题.构建了食品生产者的演化博弈模型,分析了不同监管下的生产者的行为选择策略.得出如下结论:食品生产者个体的生产改进行为与监管部门的监管强度正相关;食品生产者个体在监管情境下,其个体独立参与行为和协同参与行为选择不一致:弱监管情境下,生产者协同改进生产与协同改进生产所带来的收益密切相关:强监管情境下,生产者协同改进生产行为与协同收益和政府约束的力度有关.

This paper studies the behavior choice of food producers under different regulatory situations.The evolutionary game model of food producers is constructed,and the behavior choice strategies of producers under different supervision are analyzed.The conclusions are as follows:the production improvement behavior of individual food producers is positively related to the supervision intensity of the regulatory authorities;the choice of individual independent participation behavior and collaborative participation behavior of individual food producers is inconsistent under the supervision situation;under the weak supervision situation,the cooperative improvement behavior of producers is closely related to the benefits of cooperative improvement production;under the strong supervision situation,the cooperative improvement behavior of producers is not consistent.It is related to the improvement of production behavior and the degree of synergy benefits and government constraints.