内幕交易犯罪识别路径研究:从发行人许可的“内幕交易”谈起

Research on Insider Trading Crime Identification Path:From Issuer Licensed"Insider Trading"

近年来,部分美国学者主张允许发行人许可的内幕交易,在我国执法环境中,上述行为大概率将被认定为具有行政违法性,但是否当然地引发对当事人刑事责任的追究则有待商榷。本文对我国内幕交易犯罪的法益识别理论进行了反思,主张根据以信义义务为基础的反欺诈理论对内幕交易中值得刑法保护的法益加以甄别。司法机关应当对内幕交易案件进行独立判断,在发行人许可并对特定内幕信息知情人参与交易的行为及时予以披露的情形当中,即便在超额收益与行为人所具备信息优势地位间存在可被证明的因果关系,因不存在对发行人和股东的欺诈,仍应考虑非犯罪化处理的可能。借此希望为司法实践提供一种有效、稳定且克制的裁判路径,缓解当前由行政机关把握内幕交易"入罪"节奏的实践难题。

Since recent years,some American scholars have claimed that issuer-licensed insider trading should be allowed.If cases of this kind occur in China,then they are highly likely to be regarded as administratively illegal considering China’s current legal regime and enforcement status quo.However,it remains questionable whether such hypothetical insider trading cases would raise criminal liabilities.Therefore,this article revisits the current interest-identifying criminal theories in China,and argues that anti-fraud theory that derives from fiduciary duty should be introduced to identify the essential interest that should be protected by criminal law for insider trading.Moreover,this article argues China’s judiciary should independently ascertain if the insider trading cases before it should criminalized,and further specify certain types of insider trading behaviors(including issuer-licensed insider trading)that should be decriminalized.