职权交叉点避责:地方立法中的部门利益博弈

Responsibility Shirking at the Intersection of Authority:The Departmental Interest Game in Local Legislation

地方立法作为一种决策过程,各环节牵涉多个行政部门,部门利益展现于各阶段。本文以《G省食品生产加工小作坊和食品摊贩管理条例》的制定过程为例,探究地方立法过程中职权交叉点避责的博弈模型。从分析案例可以看到,在起草、审议、审查几个不同的立法阶段,几大主要部门展开六轮博弈,在部门利益本位驱动下使用博弈工具,寻求职权交叉点避责,在同级主导的立法起草过程中博弈强度达到最大。立法博弈过程存在博弈工具、内在动力与外在环境三种运行逻辑,最终指向都是职权交叉点的避责。这种博弈行为模式给地方立法带来诸多困境,需要采取若干措施规制地方立法中可能泛滥的部门利益。

As a decision-making process,the local legislation always involves several administrative departments,and the departmental interests are shown at different stages.Through a case study of the drafting process of Regulations on the Administration of Small Food Production and Processing Workshops and Food Vendors in G Province,this article explores the local legislation game model of responsibility shirking at the intersection of authority.At drafting,deliberation and review stages of the legislation,several major departments take six rounds of games.These major departments seek to shirk responsibilities at the intersection of authority,and the game intensity reaches maximum in the legislative drafting process of the same level.The legislation has three operating logics:game tools,intrinsic motivation and external environment,all of which lead to responsibility shirking at the intersection of authority.This pattern of game brings problems to local legislation process.As a consequence,local legislation demands efficient regulation to the departmental interests.