国有企业混合所有制改革与民营企业社会责任

Mixed-ownership Reform of State-owned Enterprises and Social Responsibility of Private Enterprises

在国有企业混合所有制改革背景下,民营企业会否承担更多的社会责任,是一个重要但现有文献较少讨论的问题。在行业中同时存在国有企业、民营企业的混合寡头竞争框架下,通过分析民营企业所有者做出的委托选择,探讨了国有企业在行业内部监管中发挥的作用。在古诺竞争时,民营企业所有者会通过向经理人提供同时包含企业利润目标和社会责任目标(社会福利或消费者剩余)的激励契约设计,选择承担社会责任;特别地,当市场竞争足够剧烈且国有企业的国有股份比重足够低时,民营企业所有者在激励契约中赋予社会责任目标的权重甚至会高于国有企业。然而在伯川德竞争时,民营企业所有者向其经理人提供的最优委托契约只包含利润目标,即赋予社会责任目标的权重为零。此外,当企业序贯行动时,虽然民营企业所有者在民营企业充当领导者角色的斯坦克尔伯格领袖竞争情形下选择在激励契约中不包含社会责任目标,但在国有企业充当领导者角色的斯坦克尔伯格领袖竞争情形下选择在激励契约中包含社会责任目标。最后,选取蒙牛与伊利的寡头竞争作为案例,结合基本理论模型和所得结论进行分析。

At the background of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,whether private enterprises will undertake more social responsibilities is an important but less discussed issue.Under the framework of mixed market structure,this paper explores the state-owned enterprises role in the internal regulation of the industry by analyzing the delegation choice faced by owners of private enterprises.This paper shows that under Cournot competition,owners of private enterprises will choose to undertake social responsibility by providing their managers with incentive contracts that include both corporate profit goals and social responsibility goals(social welfare or consumer surplus).In particular,when the market competition is intense enough and the state shares in state-owned enterprises is low enough,private enterprises will even attach greater weight to social responsibility than state-owned counterparts.However,under the Bertrand competition,the optimal incentive contract provided by the owners of private enterprises to their managers only contains the profit goals,that is,the social responsibility goals are given zero weight.Moreover,when the enterprises moved sequentially and compete under Stackelberg where private enterprises act as leaders,those private enterprises owners choose not to include social responsibility goals in their incentive contracts,but they choose to include social responsibility goals in incentive contracts when state-owned enterprises act as leaders.Finally,combined with the basic model established in this paper and the results obtained,this paper selects the oligopoly competition between Mengniu and Yili as an example for further analysis.