论“动物权利”之道德实践的优先级

On the Priority of the Moral Practice of Animal Rights

作为一种新的伦理学,汤姆·里根的“动物权利”具有巨大的意义,因为,它不仅仅是一场革命性的进路,也是一个系统性体系,即本体、价值与实践之间的有机联系性。但是,在权利论庞大的实践体系中,不同实践主张之间的优先级关系是模糊的。这为权利论的道德实践带来了不确定性。以此,本文通过考察“动物权利”之系统内部的有机联系性,来阐明不同实践主张之间在道德考量层面的优先级关系。这种实践主张间的比较既包括在“消极”意义上的道德义务,也包括在“积极”意义上的实践原则。本文的分析展示了在道德考量性的层面,不伤害义务的优先级高于“协助”或“慈善”的实践,后者的优先级又高于“增加裨益”的实践。是为道德实践优先级的阐明。进而,分析指出,协助或慈善的义务性只能体现在社会层面,而非个体层面。这一点,既是对于动物权利之实践论的一个修正,也应当作为所有伦理学在道德实践方面的一项基本原则。

Tom Regan’s Animal Rights,as a new ethics,bears great significance because it is not only a revolutionary approach but also a systematic framework,namely,its logical connectedness among its ontological,axiological and practical part.With respect to the practical system of Animal Rights,however,the order of priority is unclear among different practical propositions.This brings uncertainty to the moral practice of the rights view.In this paper,by referring to the connectedness within the system of Animal Rights,I clarify the order of priority with respect to moral consideration among different practical propositions,which include moral duties in a“negative”sense and practical principles in a“positive”sense.The analysis demonstrates that at the level of moral consideration,the duty not to harm takes priority over the practice of“assistance/beneficence”,and the latter takes priority over the practice“to increase benefit”.This constitutes the clarification of the order of priority among moral practices.Further,the analysis confirms that assistance/beneficence could only be an appropriate duty imposed on a society rather than on an individual.This point,as a revision to the practical system of Animal Rights,should also be a general principle of moral practice shared by all ethics.