帝国的军事宿命——兵制中的国家治理逻辑

Military Destiny of Empire:The Institutional Logic of Governance in China's Civil-Military Relations

已有的关于国家治理逻辑的探讨侧重于央地关系而忽略了其他领域。本文通过相关的历史社会学分析,展现了帝国在兵制中的国家治理逻辑。本文发现,不同于央地关系,中央政府在兵制上往往缺乏平衡效率与风险的手段。这是因为国家对土地的控制力同时形塑了帝国军队的职业化水平(军事效率)以及士兵控制(军事风险)。因此,帝国在失去对土地的控制时,会陷入军事效率与军事风险二选一的困境,而无论采取哪种选择,帝国最终都无法逃避覆灭的宿命。这一发现向我们揭示了一套不同于主流文献的、基于结构的中国国家治理理论。

Previous research regards the efficiency—risk dilemma as the major problem in central-local relations and emphasizes the motility of the central government.The paper tries to explore the logic of state governance in China's civil-military relations.The paper finds that the central government can't handle the dilemma in civil-military relation like other issues because both efficiency and risk are influenced by the key factor-state capacity on land.On the one hand,military pressure and state capacity together determine the efficiency of the military.On the other hand,state capacity is associated with financial revenue and placement,which are important to control the army on active duty and veteran.Therefore,the empire was often confronted with a dilemma:seeking efficiency at the expense of risk or reducing risk at the expense of efficiency.However,neither choice could help the empire survive.The finding illustrates the structure-based theory of state governance.