交往理论开端上的“命运”冲突——重审哈贝马斯早年对黑格尔耶拿精神哲学的解读

The Conflict of Fate at the Outset of the Theory of Communicative Action:A Critical Review on Habermas’ Early Interpretation of Hegel’s Jena Philosophy of Spirit

哈贝马斯在黑格尔早年的精神哲学草案中发现了一种契合他自己思路的主体间性哲学的雏形,黑格尔这种独特的思想特别体现在他关于“命运”的学说当中。哈贝马斯重视其中关系主体的理论出发点,从中看到了有别于以利益主体为原则的社会理论方案的全新可能性,这构成了他交往行动学说的重要思想来源。然而在一个关键问题的理解上,哈贝马斯却与年轻的黑格尔缺乏共同的思想基础。他将互动与劳动对立的解释图式在哲学史上追溯到黑格尔早年对费希特自我意识学说的批判,却忽视了黑格尔在这一时期对费希特思想的批判性继承。在行动的主客体同一性要求中,劳动和互动应当被视为具有共同的结构,这也是“理性”在费希特那里原本的含义。哈贝马斯把黑格尔早期的“精神”概念解释为“互动的媒介”,使其理论方案在原则上远离劳动的概念,以此翻开了批判理论新的一页同时,这一全新理论所内含的思维方式的缺陷也在交往理性时代的社会现实中日渐突显出来。

J. Habermas discovered a prototype of a theory of intersubjectivity from Hegel’s early philosophy of spirit,especially exemplified in his concept of‘fate’(Schicksal). He attached great importance to this concept for being based on the idea of interaction and reviewed‘labour’and‘interaction’in opposition to each other by referring to Hegel’s criticism on Fichte’s philosophy of consciousness. However, Habermas ignored Hegel’s critical adaptation of Fichte’s thinking at the very time when these critical writings were composed.In this respect,‘labour’and‘interaction’should be considered as action structured in an analog way by claiming the identity of subject and object(act as fact), which is the original meaning of reason by Fichte. Habermas interpreted Hegel’s‘spirit’as media of interaction, which in principle kept the theory design away from the concept of‘labour’, and then opened a new page of Critical Theory with his unique paradigm. The practical meaning of this misconception slowly emerged in the era of communicative rationality.