集团统一审计对异常关联交易是否存在抑制效应

Does the Business Group Unified Audit Reduce Abnormal-Related Party Transactions?

关联交易是企业集团日常经营活动中的一项重要且普遍的交易类型,但异常关联交易也可能成为企业集团利润操纵的工具。本文选取2014—2018年沪深主板非金融上市公司为研究对象,考察集团统一审计对上市公司异常关联交易的影响,以期回答统一审计是不是集团治理的一种特殊机制。研究发现,集团统一审计通过发挥知识溢出效应,有效抑制了异常关联交易,而这种影响主要存在于"大所"。异常关联交易是审计师关注的重点内容,不论是复核合伙人还是项目负责人,均能显著抑制异常关联交易。进一步研究发现,集团统一审计对下一期的异常关联交易也存在抑制作用;集团统一审计的审计师任期越长,越能抑制异常关联交易;相较于地方国有企业,集团统一审计更能显著抑制中央企业的异常关联交易。研究结论表明,统一审计可以成为集团治理的一种特殊有效机制。本文的研究结论为监管机构完善集团治理、更好发挥审计的治理作用,提供了新的参考依据。

Related party transactions is important in the daily business activities,but it may also be a tool for large shareholder to manipulate profits.This paper examines whether group unified audit will have influence on abnormal related party transactions.It finds that the group unified audit effectively reduces abnormal related party transactions by playing "knowledge spillover" effect.The paper shows that companies unified audited by "Big4" can significantly reduce abnormal related party transactions.Further research shows that the group’s unified audit also reduces the abnormal related party transactions in the next period.The longer the auditor’s tenure of the group’s unified audit,the more it can reduce abnormal related party transactions.Compared with local state-owned enterprises,group unified audit can significantly reduce abnormal related party transactions of central enterprises.The conclusion shows that unified audit can become a special and effective mechanism of group governance.This paper provides a new literature for regulators to improve group governance.