线上分类回收平台的道德风险决策研究

Moral Hazard of the Reverse Commerce Provider

线上回收模式采用“线上分类交易+线下物流”机制,可大幅提高交易效率,然而也面临严重的信任危机。掌握回收平台的道德风险决策机理,对于解决行业困境至关重要。考虑一个线上回收平台向顾客收购两个等级旧产品的交易系统,其中顾客可能低估或高估持有产品等级。平台存在道德风险从顾客低估中获利;顾客可利用逆向选择规避该风险。基于Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了顾客的订单提交决策和平台的最优道德风险概率决策。分析结果表明,平台并非总是存在不诚实动机,取决于产品质量分布以及双方争价的相对成本。研究结论对线上回收模式的监管和规范具有较强的管理启示。

The business pattern of reverse commerce improves the performance of used-product buyback a lot.However,the lack of customer trust brings reverse commerce providers into the dilemma of frequent price renegotiation.To solve the problem,we investigate whether cheating makes the provider better off.This paper considers the transaction in which a provider buys back two grades of used products.A customer may underestimate or overestimate the grade of his product.The provider always picks out the customer’s overestimation error,but a moral hazard may happen as to the customer’s underestimation error.To avoid the risk,customers may select the grade adversely.Using the Stackelberg game model,we explore order submission decisions of the customer and optimal moral hazard probability decisions of the provider.The results show that the reverse commerce provider is not always dishonest.It depends on both the quality profile of used products and the renegotiation cost of buyer and seller.Our findings provide helpful managerial insights for the policymaker to supervise online reverse commerce.