外部大股东退出威胁与企业投资效率:理论模型与实证检验

Outside Blockholders’Exit Threats and Investment Efficiency:Theoretical Model and Empirical Research

外部大股东在公司治理中的作用一直是学术界和实务界重点关注的话题。本文以退出威胁作为切入点,考察外部大股东影响企业投资决策的机理。实证结果表明:外部大股东退出威胁可以有效地提高企业的投资效率,退出威胁每上升一个标准差将提高3.941%的投资效率;外部大股东退出威胁的治理效应主要是依赖于管理层对于自身持股财富和股权质押爆仓风险的担忧;长期型外部大股东退出威胁的治理作用更为显著,而短期型外部大股东退出威胁的作用不显著。

The role of outside blockholders in corporate governance has always been the focus of academic and practical circles.Taking exit threat as a starting point,this paper investigates the mechanism of external major shareholders’influence on enterprise investment decisions.The empirical result shows that:(1)The outside blockholders’exit threat effectively promotes the corporate investment efficiency,and one standard deviation plus in exit threat increases 3.941%of investment efficiency.(2)The governance effect of outside blockholders’exit threat is mainly dependent on management’s concerns about the risks of its own holdings of wealth and pledge of stock rights.(3)Long-term outside blockholders’exit threat plays a more significant role in governance,while short-term outside blockholders'exit threat does not play a significant role.