摘要
业绩反馈对企业战略行为的影响是当前战略管理领域关注的主要内容。以2009—2017年沪深两市A股主板上市公司为样本,从代理观出发,运用系统GMM方法实证研究了CEO离职行为发生与否的情境下业绩期望落差与企业冗余资源之间的关系。研究发现:业绩期望落差对沉淀性冗余资源和非沉淀性冗余资源存在着明显的代理效应;CEO离职对业绩期望落差与沉淀性冗余资源之间关系具有显著的调节作用,当发生CEO离职时,业绩期望落差对沉淀性冗余资源具有显著影响,而CEO非离职情境下这种影响则不显著。
The impact of performance feedback on enterprise strategic behaviors is the main focus of current strategic management.This paper uses Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share listed enterprises in 2009-2017 as a sample,and from the perspective of agency,empirically studies the relationship between performance below aspiration and slack resources under the situation of whether CEO turnover occurs through system GMM method.The study finds that the performance below aspiration has an obvious agency effect on absorbed slack resources and unabsorbed slack resources.CEO turnover significantly moderates the relationship between performance below aspiration and absorbed slack resources.When CEO turnover occurs,the performance below aspiration has a significant effect on absorbed slack resources,but the effect is not significant in the CEO non-turnover situation.
作者
李莹
刘力钢
LI Ying;LIU Ligang(Business School, Liaoning University, Shenyang 110136, China)
出处
《东北大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第1期44-52,共9页
Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)
基金
辽宁省社会科学规划基金资助项目(L20CGL005)。
关键词
业绩期望落差
冗余资源
CEO离职
高新技术企业
业绩反馈
performance below aspiration
slack resources
CEO turnover
high-tech enterprise
performance feedback