论《逻辑哲学论》中的自我概念

On the Concept of Self in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中关于“自我”概念的讨论,集中于5.6命题及其子命题,主要论述他所说的“哲学的我”或“形而上学主体”概念。通过考察各命题之间的逻辑关系以及当代解释者提出的各种观点,我们看到,只能在逻辑形式框架下讨论“世界”和“语言”概念,确认两者之间的逻辑链接点,才能真正理解维特根斯坦的真实思想。根据维特根斯坦在5.6命题表达的核心观点,自我处于一个界限上,自我本身就是界限,它规定了我们可以用语言去谈论和言说的范围。由于逻辑规定了可说与不可说的界限,逻辑概念与自我概念就是同一个概念,逻辑即自我。因此,维特根斯坦在书中所讨论的自我概念应当是一个逻辑自我概念。

Wittgenstein’s discussion on the concept of“self”in Tractatus focuses on proposition 5.6 and its sub-propositions,mainly on the concept of“Philosophical I”or“Metaphysical Subject”.By investigating the logical relationship of the propositions and the various viewpoints put forward by contemporary researchers,it demonstrates that,only by discussing the concepts of“world”and“language”under the framework of logical form and confirming the logical links between them can we truly understand Wittgenstein’s real thought.According to Wittgenstein’s core view expressed in the proposition 5.6,the ego is on a limit and the ego itself is the limit,which stipulates the scope that we can talk and speak in language.As the logic stipulates the limit between what we can speak about and what we cannot speak about,the concepts of logic and ego are the same concept,logic is ego or I.Therefore,the concept of the self in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus should be a logical I.