摘要
德雷福斯对人工智能的现象学批判并未真正深入到此在的本真性与自主性的视角,主要原因在于他只是突出了此在作为常人操劳在世的维度,而没有看到此在是以时间性的整体方式生存,由此导致他的熟练应对或涉身应对技能理论招致了众多的批评。此在作为时间性整体存在的“本性”表明,此在通达世界的源始方式既非形式的也非非形式的,而是介于这两者“之间”的。鉴于此,德雷福斯对符号主义人工智能的形式化本质的批判以及对海德格尔式人工智能的非形式化路径的肯定都有失偏颇,由时间性此在所揭示出来的人工智能的发展方向,应该致力于此在形式与非形式化生存的内在融合与统一,而这并非通过两者的简单相加便可达到,而是要呈现界于形式与非形式化“之间”的“关联领域”,由此便构成了人工智能发展所面临的真正挑战之处。
Dreyfus’s critique of artificial intelligence based on phenomenology does not really have depth into the perspectives of authenticity and autonomy of Dasein.The main reason is that he just highlighted the Taking Care dimension of the They,and did not see that Dasein exists as a whole unity of its temporality.This is also the essential reason for his theory of skillful or embodied coping facing much criticism.The essence of Dasein’s temporality shows that the primary way Dasein relates to the world is neither formalized nor nonformalized,but between the two.Given this,Dreyfus’s critique of the formalized essence of Symbolic AI and his affirmation of the nonformalized attribute of Heidegger AI are both one-sided.The temporal Dasein reveals that AI should be committed to the internal fusion of its formalized and nonformalized existence and make it a whole unity.This cannot be achieved through combining the two together externally,instead it needs to present correlation fields’between the formal and non-formal fields.This constitutes the real challenge for AI.
作者
李日容
LI Ri-rong(Centre of Foreign Literature and Culture,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,Guangzhou 510420,Guangdong)
出处
《陕西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第1期37-47,共11页
Journal of Shaanxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“当代新兴增强技术前沿的人文主义哲学研究”(ZD20&045)。