接受关联担保与审计收费——基于违规风险和过度负债的机制检验

Related Party Guarantee and Audit Fees:Mechanism Test Based on Violation Risk and Excessive Debt

以2007—2019年深沪A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验上市公司接受关联担保对审计收费、审计意见的影响。研究发现,上市公司接受关联担保行为显著提高了审计收费以及被出具非标准审计意见的概率,并且担保规模越大,审计收费越高,被出具非标准审计意见的概率越大。从作用机制来看,违规风险与过度负债在关联担保影响审计收费的过程中具有中介传导作用。进一步研究表明,接受关联担保的上市公司在以后年度被财务重述的概率增加。此外,分析师跟踪具有外部监督作用,关联担保对审计收费的影响在分析师跟踪较多时不显著。

Taking the 2007—2019 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as research objects,this paper empirically tests the impact of related party guarantee on audit fees and audit opinions.The results show that listed companies acceptance of related party guarantee significantly increases audit fees and the probability of being issued non-standard audit opinion,and the greater amount of guarantee,the higher the audit fees and the higher the probability of being issued non-standard audit opinion.From the mechanism of action,violation risk and excessive debt both play an intermediary role in the relationship between related party guarantee and audit fees.The further study shows that the probability of financial restatement increases for companies accepting related party guarantee in the following years.In addition,analysts tracking the relevant operation have the function of external supervision.The impact of related party guarantee on audit fees is not significant in the group with more analysts tracking.