主体与情感:论“情理学派”境界论的内在理路

Subject and Emotion:On the Internal Logic of the Realm Theory of“Emotion and Reason School”

从冯友兰的“人生境界论”到蒙培元的“心灵境界论”,再到黄玉顺的“生活境界论”,“情理学派”的境界学说不断完善。冯友兰把人作为认识主体,结果导致其境界论有着不可克服的矛盾。蒙培元指出人不仅是认识主体(相对主体),更是集认识、情感、意志等于一体的、不可分析的绝对主体,修正了冯友兰的境界论。黄玉顺则立足于“主体何以可能”的问题,指出人的最高境界不是具有绝对主体性的“天地境界”,而是回归前主体的“本源境界”,实现了对前两者的超越。同时,“情感”的层级问题作为一条内在理路贯穿其中。

From Feng Youlan’s“Life Realm Theory”to Meng Peiyuan’s“Soul Realm Theory”,and then to Huang Yushun’s“Living Realm Theory”,the Realm Theory of“Emotion and Rreason School”has been continuously improved.Feng Youlan regards man as the cognitive subject,which leads to an insur⁃mountable contradiction in his Realm Theory.Meng Peiyuan points out that man is not only a cognitive sub⁃ject(relative subject),but also an inextricable absolute subject integrating cognition,emotion and will.He revised Feng Youlan’s Realm Theory.Basing on the problem of“How the subject is possible”,Huang Yus⁃hun points out that man’s highest realm is not the“realm of heaven and earth”with absolute subjectivity,but the“original realm”of the subject before return.He achieves the transcendence of the first two.At the same time,the hierarchy of“emotion”runs through it as an internal way.