高质量发展视域下制造业企业创新与绩效研究--基于高管薪酬激励、股权集中度的影响

Innovation and Performance of Manufacturing Enterprises under High Quality Development:Based on the Effect of Executive Compensation Incentive and Equity Concentration

以2011—2018年我国深沪A股制造业上市公司为初始样本,研究我国制造业上市公司高管薪酬激励、股权集中度对企业创新与绩效的影响机制,并在此基础上开展不同产权性质下的对比分析,以期为我国制造业企业高质量发展提供新的参考视角。研究结果表明,薪酬激励、股权集中度对企业创新与绩效的影响存在产权性质上的差异:(1)薪酬激励与企业绩效、创新投入之间均存在正向效应,且这一现象在国有企业中更显著;(2)民营企业股权集中度对企业绩效的带动作用更强;(3)在低分位民营企业中,随着股权集中度的提高,薪酬激励对企业绩效的正向带动作用也有所增强;(4)股权集中度的提高会抑制薪酬激励对创新投入的带动作用,且在民营企业中抑制程度更高。

By taking A-share manufacturing listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2011 to 2018 as the initial sample,this paper explores the impact mechanism of executive compensation incentive and equity concentration on the innovation and performance of manufacturing listed companies in China.And on this basis,a comparative analysis of different property rights is conducted to provide a new perspective for the highquality development of manufacturing enterprises.The results show that compensation incentives and equity concentration have different effects on enterprise innovation and performance in terms of property rights:(1)compensation incentive has positive effects on enterprise performance and innovation input,and this phenomenon is more significant in state-owned enterprises;(2)in private enterprises,equity concentration plays a more important role in promoting enterprise performance;(3)in low-quantile private enterprises,with the increase of equity concentration,the positive effect of compensation incentive on enterprise performance is also enhanced;(4)the increase of equiy concentration will inhibit the driving effect of compensation incentive on innovation input,and the inhibition degree is higher in private enterprises.