考虑双重努力因素的制造商和零售商投资机制设计

The Investment Mechanism Design for Manufacturer and Retailer Based on Double Effort Factors

以往研究主要集中在制造商的质量提高和零售商的销售努力投资。而本文在需求依赖于质量努力和销售努力的前提下,制造商和零售商遵循Stackelberg博弈情形,研究不同供应链成员承担质量努力和销售努力成本对产品定价和利润的影响。商业实践表明,制造商和零售商都有动机对质量努力和销售努力进行投资,由此制定三种投资决策模式:制造商和零售商分别投资、仅制造商投资和仅零售商投资质量努力和销售努力。研究结果表明,零售价格、订购量、质量努力和销售努力水平均随着质量和销售努力成本的增大而递减;制造商更愿意让零售商投资质量努力和销售努力,而零售商可能不愿意让制造商进行投资;在零售商独立投资的情形下,供应链成员的利润以及质量努力和销售努力水平大于其他情形。

Quality efforts and sales efforts play an important role in enhancing market demand and competitiveness. Despite the importance of synchronizing marketing activities with manufacturer’s quality decisions, little research has been done. Furthermore, the impact of manufacturer’s willingness to invest in sales efforts and retailer’s willingness to invest in quality efforts remains unclear. Along with these issues, a Stackelberg game for manufacturer and retailer is adopted to study the effect of quality efforts and sales efforts cost borne by different supply chain members on product pricing and profits. Previous studies and industry practices have shown that manufacturer and retailer have incentives to invest in quality efforts and sales efforts.Therefore, three investment decision models are developed: the investment is made by themanufacturer and retailer respectively, only the manufacturer, or only the retailer. A question that arises naturally is which one is preferred by the manufacturer, the retailer, and the chain. It is found that themanufacturer prefers to have the retailer make the investment. However, the retailer may be reluctant to let manufacturer invest. Moreover, it is concluded that retail price, order quantity, quality efforts level and sales efforts level all decrease with the increase of quality effort and sales effort cost. Meanwhile, the results show that in the case that retailer bear the cost of quality efforts and sales efforts, supply chain members’ profit as well as quality efforts and sales efforts levels are higher than that in others. The results are applied to supply chain management and some new insights are gained. More attention should be paid to retailers’ incentives to invest.Manufacturers should strengthen cooperation with retailers and design contracts to encourage retailers to invest in quality and sales promotion.