董事高管责任保险、机构投资者持股与会计稳健性

Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance,Institutional Investor Shareholding and Accounting Conservatism

董事高管责任保险会转移管理层的诉讼风险并降低其诉讼成本,进而诱发机会主义行为。基于此,文章以2010-2019年我国A股上市公司为样本,研究了董事高管责任保险对会计稳健性的影响及其作用机制。研究发现:上市公司购买董事高管责任保险降低了企业会计稳健性。作用机制分析表明,董事高管责任保险会加剧管理层自利行为,从而影响会计稳健性。进一步研究发现,机构投资者作为主要的利益相关者,对管理层起到了有效的监督作用,从而减弱了董事高管责任保险对会计稳健性的负向影响。该研究结论拓展了董事高管责任保险的治理效应,丰富了会计稳健性影响因素的理论研究,对企业实现有效的内部治理具有重要意义。

Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance will transfer management’s litigation risks and reduce litigation costs,thereby inducing opportunistic behavior.Based on this,the paper uses my country’s A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 as a sample to study the impact of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance on accounting conservatism and its mechanism.The study finds that:the purchase of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance by listed companies reduces the stability of corporate accounting.The analysis of the mechanism of action shows that directors’ and officers’ liability insurance will aggravate management’s self-interest,thereby affecting accounting conservatism.Further research finds that as the main stakeholders,institutional investors’ shareholding can effectively supervise the management,which will weaken the influence of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance on accounting conservatism.The research conclusion expands the governance effect of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance,enriches the theoretical research on the factors affecting accounting conservatism,and is of great significance to the realization of effective internal governance of enterprises.