代理人过度自信条件下最优激励契约与备货联合决策研究

The optimal joint incentive contract designs and inventory decisions with an overconfident agent

本文研究了代理人过度自信对委托人最优激励契约设计及最优备货决策的影响,建立了代理人过度自信时的最优激励契约与备货联合决策模型,得到并比较了代理人过度估计和过度精确两类过度自信类型下委托人的最优激励契约与最优订货量决策,并数值验证了相关结论.研究发现:库存耗尽的阈值契约是最优的契约形式,且不同过度自信类型对最优联合决策的影响具有显著差异;与代理人完全理性情况相比,过度精确(过度估计)会导致最优契约的奖励提高(降低)以及最优订货量降低(降低或提高);过度估计可缓解道德风险引起的最优订货量偏高现象,甚至产生比无道德风险情况下更高的利润,而过度精确可能进一步加剧订货量偏离现象.

This paper investigates the principal’s joint incentive contract designs and inventory decisions when the agent is subject to the behavioral bias such as overconfidence.Building on the principal-agent model and newsvendor model,we distinguish two common types of overconfidence:Overestimation and overprecision,and investigate their impacts on the joint optimal contract designs and optimal inventory decisions,respectively.We find that quota-bonus contracts that clear the inventory is optimal and different types of overconfidence can lead to significantly different or even opposite insights on the optimal decisions.Specifically,overprecision(resp.overestimation)results in a higher(resp.lower)bonus of the optimal contract and a lower(resp.higher or lower)inventory level compared with the counterpart with a rational agent.Furthermore,overestimation may yield higher profit than the first-best solution without moral hazard and mitigate the well-known overstocking phenomenon caused by moral hazard while overprecision may exaggerate the overstocking behavior.