摘要
以风险社会为适用背景,对环境违法举报奖励机制的风险、成本进行博弈探讨,结论包括:环境违法举报奖励机制能有效降低违法率、公众参与是机制有效运行的关键、合作路径中风险型举报奖励方式能使整个博弈达到最小损益值。但博弈模型存有理论缺少实践验证、风险法律界定问以及路径选择存在不确定性等不足之处,这需继续对环境违法举报奖励机制进行实证研究,通过量化、视图化等研究方法得出的现实观察结果是:举报数量上升但总量不大、举报难度和奖金数额加大、风险规避性内容规定增加、机制由"沿海-内陆和平地-高地"逐渐西向建立等。实证研究验证了博弈分析方法确有可行性的同时,地方文本的立法趋势和立法实践还可对博弈理论进行纠偏和补充。因此,博弈收益均衡讨论需结合现实观察就环境违法举报奖励作出客观评价,并就环境违法举报奖励机制建设提出相应对策建议:强化立法条款中风险规制内容、制定适应"三主体"的多元激励措施、完善水污染举报和固体污染举报相关规定、保障经济相对落后地区的机制建设工作、建立健全全局举报奖励机制。
This paper dscussps the risk and cost of the reward mechanism of environmental illegal reporting in the context of risk society.The conclusion is that increasing illegal costs is the key to effectively reduce the probability of illegal reporting by producers and operators,and that the risky illegal reporting path can make the overall game profit highest after pollution,but under some applicable circumstances,the theory has some shortcomings,such as the legal definition of risks,the uncertainty of path choice and the lack of reality inspection,which needs to test and correct the theory through the realistic development research of environmental illegal reporting reward.The practical observation results obtained by quantitative and visualized research methods are as follows:the number of reports increases but the total amount is not large;the difficulty of reporting and the amount of reward increase;the provisions of risk avoidance content increase;and the mechanism is gradually established from coastal to inland and from land to highland.The case study verifies the feasibility of the game analysis method and also finds the legislative development trend and practical path selection direction which is difficult to be interpreted by the game theory.Therefore,it is necessary to combine the discussion of game revenue balance with practical observation to objectively evaluate the reward for environmental illegal reporting,and put forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions for the construction of reward mechanism for environmental illegal reporting:Strengthen the risk regulation content in the legislative provisions,formulate multiple incentive measures to adapt to the"three main bodies",improve the relevant provisions of water pollution reporting and solid pollution reporting,guarantee the mechanism construction of relatively backward areas,establish and improve the overall reporting reward mechanism.
作者
方印
杨丽
Fang Yin;Yang Li
出处
《湖湘法学评论》
2021年第2期29-52,共24页
HUXIANG LAW REVIEW
基金
贵州大学人文社科学术创新团队建设项目:我国生态环境法制及防震减灾法若干问题研究(GDT2017003)。
关键词
风险社会
环境违法
举报奖励
博弈论诠释
机制建设
risk society
environmental illegality
reward of illegal report
interpretation of game theory
mechanism construction