基于演化博弈的装配式建筑激励政策研究

Research on Incentive Policies of Prefabricated Building based on Evolutionary Game

装配式建筑较传统现浇建筑具有环保节能、生产效率高、节约劳动力的优势,因而政府接连出台相关政策推动其发展。本文基于演化博弈理论,从政府激励视角,探讨政府与建设单位关于装配式建筑开发的动态行为决策问题;并通过Matlab仿真分析,为有效激励建设单位主动开发装配式建筑提供依据。研究结果表明:超额收益、政策补贴、罚金对建设单位策略选择产生正向激励,而政府通过合理制定惩罚机制、合理控制监管成本、创造装配式建筑市场需求、合理制定激励政策并抓紧落实来激励建设单位开发装配式建筑。

Compared with traditional cast-in-place buildings, prefabricated buildings have the advantages of environmental protection, energy saving, high production efficiency, and labor saving.Therefore, the government has successively issued relevant policies to promote its development.Based on the evolutionary game theory and from the perspective of government incentives, this paper discusses the dynamic behavioral decision-making issues of the government and construction units on the development of prefabricated buildings, and through Matlab simulation analysis, provides a basis for effective incentives for construction units to actively develop prefabricated buildings.The research results show that excess income, policy subsidies, and fines generate positive incentives for the construction unit’s strategic choices.And the government has established a reasonable penalty mechanism, reasonably controlled regulatory costs, created market demand for prefabricated construction, and reasonably formulated incentive policies and implemented them to encourage construction units to develop prefabricated buildings.