转移支付对地方政府税收努力的影响研究——基于信息不对称的央地政府间博弈分析

Research on the Impact of Transfer Payment on Local Tax Collection Effort——A Game Theoretical Model Between Central and Local Governments Based on Information Asymmetry

本文基于信息不对称视角,构建了央地政府间的博弈模型和分析框架,研究了不同类型转移支付对地方政府税收努力的影响。研究发现:第一,信息不对称下一般性转移支付同时存在税收替代和税收激励两种效应,随着地方生产性公共支出影响经济产出的程度不同,一般性转移支付对地方政府税收努力的净效应有所不同,且存在净效应呈中性的情况。第二,生产性专项转移支付对地方政府税收努力存在着反向影响,民生性专项转移支付对地方政府税收努力的影响呈中性。第三,法定税率、地方政府的公共支出偏好、地方政府的绩效考核方式等因素可在一定程度上影响转移支付对地方政府收支行为的效应。

Based on the information asymmetry between the central government and local governments,we build a game theoretical model to study the effects of different transfer payments on local tax collection efforts.The research finds that:First,the general transfer payment has both tax substitution and tax incentive effects under information asymmetry,and the net effect is affected by the impact of local productive public good expenditure on economic output and there is a situation that this effect is neutral.Second,the special transfer payments for productive public goods have a negative impact on local tax collection efforts,while that for civilian public goods have a neutral impact on local tax collection efforts.Third,the statutory tax rate,local governments’preferences of public expenditure,and the performance assessment of local governments can influence the efficiency of transfer payment.