混合所有制改革能改善高能力者的分类转移盈余管理行为吗?

Can Mixed-Ownership Reform Improve the Classification Shifting of Earnings Management by Highly Capable Managers?

资本监管政策和会计政策的收紧凸显出企业核心盈余在资本市场中的重要性,引致分类转移盈余管理受到了实务界和理论界的广泛关注。利用2013—2019年A股国有和民营上市公司数据探究管理层能力对分类转移盈余管理的影响以及混合所有制改革带来的治理效应。研究发现,管理层能力越大,越容易实施分类转移盈余管理;国有企业的混合所有制改革对高能力者的分类转移盈余管理行为有显著的治理效应,体现为公司治理机制优化效应和市场化经营机制激活效应;而民营企业的混合所有制改革没有表现出显著的治理效应。研究结论为深化混合所有制改革和完善企业公司治理机制提供了经验证据。

The tightening of capital regulation policy and accounting policy has highlighted the importance of core earnings of enterprise in capital market.Therefore,classification shifting of earnings management has been widely concerned in the field of practice and theory.Based on the data of A-share state-owned and private listed companies from 2013 to 2019,this paper explores the influence of managerial ability on classification shifting of earnings management and the governance effect brought by mixed-ownership reform.The findings are as below.Firstly,the more capable the management,the easier it is to conduct classification shifting of earnings management.Secondly,the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises shows significant governance effect on the classification shifting of earnings management by highly capable managers,which is reflected in two aspects,namely corporate governance mechanism optimization effect and market-oriented mechanism activation effect.Thirdly,the mixed-ownership reform of private enterprises does not show significant governance effect.The conclusions provide empirical evidence for deepening the mixed-ownership reform and improving the corporate governance mechanism.