“缘起性空”与虚无主义问题——一个现象学的方法谈

“Dependent Origination and the Emptiness of Nature”and Nihilism:A Discuss about Method in the View of Phenomenology

与笛卡尔“怀疑一切”的方法论要求相似,龙树“万法皆空”的主张也不属于本体论和认识论,而首先并主要是一种方法论的筹划。如果笛卡尔不是确切意义上的怀疑主义者,那么龙树也不是确切意义上的虚无主义者。“空性”之所以超越了有无的本体论思考,是因为它代表了一种摒弃或悬搁所有执着的方法论操作。事实上,“空观”不是对哲学见解的断灭,而恰恰就是哲学见解,即笛卡尔式的方法论沉思。这也与胡塞尔所说遥相呼应——哲学的使命在于,通过追问使自己不拘泥于传统的、事先给定的前哲学的世界理解。“缘起性空”因而恰恰意味着对传统的、事先给定的前哲学的,甚至哲学的世界理解的不拘泥和不妄执,或者也可以说,悬搁和中止判断。

Like Descartes’methodological requirement of“doubt everything”,Nagarjuna’s idea of“all the dharmas are empty”does not belong to ontology or epistemology,either;rather,it is first and foremost a methodologicalplan.If Descartes is not an exact sceptic,then Nagarjuna is also not an exact nihilist.“Empty Nature”goes beyond the ontological consideration about Being-and-Nothing,which is due to the fact that it represents a methodologicaloperation abandoning or suspending all the wedded-ness.De facto,“Empty View”is never the ending of philosophicalideas but,exactly,an idea as such,namely,a Cartesian methodological meditation.This also corresponds to Husserl’s words:The mission of philosophy is to refrain itself,via inquiries,from being wedded to traditional and pre-given pre-philosophical understandings of the world.In this connection,“Dependent Origination and the Emptiness of Nature”exactly means refusing to be wedded to the traditional and pre-given pre-philosophical,even philosophical,understandings of the world,or,in other words,suspending and Epoché.