CEO个人特征、激励约束机制与商誉减值

CEO’s Personal Characteristics, Incentive and Restraint Mechanism and Goodwill Impairment

从商誉减值的规模和可能性两个方面,通过熵权法构造CEO个人特征指数,使用Tobit和Probit模型研究CEO个人特征对上市公司商誉减值的影响,同时考虑委托代理问题研究盈余管理动机、激励约束机制在其中的调节作用。研究结果表明:CEO个人特征越强,越能减低上市公司发生商誉减值的风险;CEO个人特征越强,商誉减值的盈余管理动机越弱;企业的激励约束机制对CEO个人特征与商誉减值的关系也能产生影响;CEO个人特征对降低上市公司商誉减值规模的作用比降低商誉减值可能性的作用更加统计显著。最后,基于研究结果,本文对监管机构、企业和投资者提出了相应的政策建议。

The influence of CEO’s personal characteristics on goodwill impairment can be studied from two aspects:scale and possibility. The CEO personal characteristics index is constructed by entropy weight method. Tobit and Probit models are used to study the impact of CEO personal characteristics on the goodwill impairment of listed companies.Meanwhile, considering the principal-agent problem, the moderating effect of earnings management motivation and incentive and constraint mechanism is studied. Results show that the stronger the CEO’s personal characteristics are, the lower the risk of goodwill impairment. The stronger the CEO’s personal characteristics, the weaker the earnings management motivation of goodwill impairment. The incentive and restraint mechanism can also influence the relationship between CEO’s personal characteristics and goodwill impairment. The effect of CEO’s personal characteristics on reducing the scale of goodwill impairment of listed companies is more statistically significant than that on reducing the possibility of goodwill impairment. Finally, based on the conclusions of the paper, this paper puts forward corresponding policy recommendations for regulators, corporates and investors.