数字经济下银行与金融科技竞合关系及优化路径

Co-opetition Relationship between Commercial Banks and Financial Technology and Optimization Path in Digital Economy

从竞合理论视角出发,构建商业银行与金融科技机构竞合关系的演化博弈模型,分析博弈双方各关键参数和惩罚约束对二者合作稳定性的影响,并利用数值仿真对模型及其结果的有效性进行了论证。研究结果表明,博弈系统的演化稳定策略具有不稳定性,商业银行和金融科技机构的竞合决策受到合作超额收益、合作成本、收益和成本分配的合理性等因素的影响;在双方理性水平出现差异时,惩罚机制可以改变系统稳定策略的演化方向,并存在一个违约惩罚临界点,使得博弈双方均选择合作策略。因此政府应该发挥自身职能,制定有效的外部约束,引导双方的竞合关系向更加健康稳定的方向发展。

From the perspective of competition and cooperation theory,an evolutionary game model of the competition and cooperation relationship between commercial banks and financial technology institutions was constructed.The influence of key parameters and punishment constraints on the cooperation stability of commercial banks and financial technology institutions was analyzed,and the model and the validity of the results was demonstrated by numerical simulation.The results show that the evolutionary stability strategy of the game system is unstable,and the decisions for competition or cooperation between commercial banks and financial technology institutions are influenced by the cooperation excess returns,the cooperation costs,and the rationality of the benefits and cost distribution.When the rationality level of both parties is different,the punishment mechanism can change the evolution direction of the system stability strategy,and there is a critical point of breaches and punishment,which makes both parties choose the cooperative strategy.Therefore,the government should give full play to its own functions,formulate effective external constraints,to guide the healthy and stable development of the competition and cooperation relationship between them.