摘要
二战后,美国将苏联视为最大的威胁,试图在垄断核武器和享有绝对核优势时对苏联发动预防性战争,并为此制定了一系列计划。核武器不仅是美国对苏政策的重要工具,也是美国维护国家安全的重器。美国政府之所以没有贸然行动,是国际和国内各种因素共同作用的结果,并且在很大程度上是基于对苏联实力的忌惮以及可能产生的后果的考虑。美国深知,采取这一冒险行动无疑要付出极其高昂的代价,不仅会失去西欧,而且美国本土也将遭受沉重打击,结局难以预料。鉴于此,美国政府制订的对苏核打击计划终成纸上谈兵。
After the World War II, the US, having a monopoly on nuclear weapons and absolute nuclear superiority, not only used this advantage as an important tool of its policy toward the USSR but also made it a key to safeguarding national security. Regarding the USSR as its biggest threat, it had also attempted to initiate a preventive war against the USSR and had formulated a series of plans for this end. But these plans were not implemented due to both international and domestic factors. To be exact, America dreaded the emergence of possible consequences because the Soviet Union had the strength and capability to revenge. The US leaders were fully aware that such a risky and costly nuclear strike was likely to cause the Soviet Union not only to wage a devastating attack on Western Europe, but also to deal a heavy blow to the US itself, thus resulting in an unaff ordable ending. Therefore, the United States fi nally aborted this attempt.
出处
《历史研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第6期163-186,M0007,M0008,共26页
Historical Research
基金
国家社科基金重点项目“冷战时期美国对德国问题的政策研究”(20ASS008)阶段性成果。